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The Constitutionality of
Affirmative Action:
Views from the Supreme Court*
By JESSE H.

CHOPER'*

Race-conscious government programs-variously called affirmative action, benign discrimination, or reverse discrimination-that classify people on the basis of race or ethnicity with
the aim of helping, rather than harming, racial and ethnic minorities have now existed for over a decade. Yet, although each
current Supreme Court Justice except Justice O'Connor has addressed the issue, there is still no authoritative opinion of the
Court on whether such programs violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
I.

THE

UNCERTAIN MESSAGE OF BAKKE

In the main, the Court managed to avoid the question altogether until 1978 in the famous case of Regents of the University

of Californiav. Bakke.1 Bakke involved a special admissions plan
adopted by the Medical School of the University of California at
Davis which set aside sixteen places in each entering class of 100
for qualified minority applicants.2

A fundamental issue that had to be addressed in Bakke was
the precise constitutional standard or test to be utilized in determining the legality of the affirmative action plan. Proponents of
the Davis program-and of affirmative action generally-had
urged that it be judged by the most lenient equal protection test,
the so-called "traditional" or "minimum rationality" approach. 3
' This paper, slightly modified, was delivered as the Roy and Virginia Ray Lecture
at the University of Kentucky College of Law, April 8, 1981. I wish to express my thanks
to Dean Thomas P. Lewis for his kindness and hospitality at the time.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. 1957, Wilkes College;
LL.B. 1960, University of Pennsylvania; D.Hu. Litt. 1967, Wilkes College. I want, as
usual, to thank my colleague, Paul J. Mishkin, for reviewing an earlier draft.
1438
U.S. 265 (1978).
2

Id. at 275.

3 See generally W. LocKiAuT, Y. KAmisAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1246-58 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as LOCKHART].
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Under that test, which the Supreme Court applies to most discriminations, a classification is upheld so long as it is rationally
related to a constitutionally permissible state interest. 4 No Justice
of the Supreme Court, however, has agreed that this is the appropriate test by which to judge affirmative action programs.
At the other end of the Court's equal protection spectrum is
the so-called "strict scrutiny" approach. Under that standard,
which the Court regularly applies to government action that discriminates against racial and ethnic minorities, the discrimination is invalid unless it is necessary (not merely rationally related)
to further a compelling (not simply a permissible) state interest.5
In Bakke, only five members of the Court spoke to the constitutionality of affirmative action. 6 Four-Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun-took the position that benign
racial or ethnic discrimination should be judged by a middle
level equal protection standard-one somewhere between the
minimum rationality test, under which virtually everything
passes muster, and the strict scrutiny test, under which virtually
nothing passes muster.I Their view was that race-conscious affirmative action must be substantially related to an importantstate
interest. 8 They added that this important state interest must be
articulated by the government agency that adopts the program. 9
Employing this standard, these four Justices voted to uphold
the set-aside of sixteen places in the Davis program. They
reasoned that remedying the present effects of past societal discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities is a sufficiently
important interest to sustain affirmative action programs. 10 But
they emphasized that they would invalidate such benign discrimination if it stigmatized anyone on the basis of race or ethnicity,
4 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
56 See LocKHART, supra note 3, at 1264 (Note 1), 1278 (Note 1).

The four Justices who joined Justice Powell to comprise the majority in BakkeChief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens-agreed that the Davis
program was unlawful, but did so on the ground that the set-aside was barred by Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids racial or ethnic discrimination in any program that receives federal financial assistance. 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
7 438 U.S. at 357-62.
8
Id. at 359.
9 Id. at 362-63.
10Id. at 362.
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or if it singled out those poorly represented in the political process
to receive the brunt of the burdens imposed." This qualification
is important to note since it may be shown in some future affirmative action case that the beneficiaries of the program are in
some way stigmatized or, more likely, that those who are bearing
the brunt of the program are themselves members of a poorly
represented minority group. If so, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-who are generally relied upon to sanction
affirmative action-may nonetheless vote to invalidate the program.
An excellent example of innocent minority groups burdened
by otherwise altruistic endeavors is found in the case of United
Jewish Organizationsv. Carey,2 which involved a redistricting
system in New York in which the plaintiffs were Hasidic Jews.
Before redistricting, the Hasidim had been concentrated in one
senate district which had a white majority and where the Hasidic
Jews constituted an important voting bloc.13 To achieve better
racial balance, the redistricting plan had divided the Hasidic
Jews between two senate districts, both of which had nonwhite
majorities.' 4 The Hasidim did not contend that this result was
motivated by anti-Semitism and most of the Justices did not focus
on that issue. Nevertheless, the case pointed to a result often attendant to the political process, namely, that those bearing the
brunt of an affirmative action program will themselves belong to
a poorly represented, identifiable minority group.
Justice Powell was the only other member of the Court to
address the constitutionality of affirmative action in Bakke. He
took the view that all racial classifications should be subject to
strict scrutiny-that is, to be valid they must be necessary to the
furtherance of a compelling state interest. 15 Insofar as college and
professional school admissions were concerned, Justice Powell
found a compelling interest in advancing diversity in the student
body. 16Further, he reasoned that it may well be necessary to give
11Id. at 361.
12

430 U.S. 144 (1977).

13Id. at 152.
14Id. at 151-52.

15 438 U.S. at 288-305.
16 Id. at 311-14.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70

a "plus" to race or ethnic background in the admissions process to
achieve such desired heterogeneity. 17 Thus, five members of the
Court in Bakke-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, along with Justice Powell-permitted some use of racial or
ethnic criteria in admissions to public higher education.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell voted to strike down the setaside of sixteen places in the Davis program. Such a practice was,
he reasoned, more than simply giving a "plus" for race or ethnicity.18 He would find the use of a racial-ethnic quota valid only if

used to remedy a past constitutional or statutory violation against
the racial or ethnic minority now being benefited. 19Further, he
said, the constitutional or statutory violation being remedied had
to be identified by a properly authorized government body. 2
In Justice Powell's view, the Bakke program did not meet
that standard. First, it had been enacted by the Medical School
faculty pursuant to a grant of authority from the University's
Board of Regents, neither of which had "the authority and capability" to identify constitutional or statutory violations.2' Second,
even if the Regents were properly authorized, Justice Powell said
that they had not identified any constitutional or statutory violation since the Medical School "had no history of discrimination."22 Rather, Justice Powell contended, the Regents and the
Medical School faculty were merely seeking to remedy general
societal discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities, a
23
purpose for which racial-ethnic quotas cannot be utilized.
II.

THE SEARCH FOR CLARIFICATION IN FULLILOVE

The other major Supreme Court decision on affirmative action-less well known than Bakke, but equally important-is
Fullilove v. Klutznick. 24 It involved the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,22 in which Congress appropriated $4 billion to
17Id. at 317-18.
18Id.at 318-20.
19 Id. at 307.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 309.
22

Id. at 296 n.36.
3Id.at 310.
24 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
25 Public Wors Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116.
2
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state and local governments for construction projects. Specifically at issue was the "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Act, which stipulated that ordinarily at least ten percent of the funds granted be expended for minority businesses.2
The statute defined "minority business enteriprise" as one with at
least fifty percent ownership by "citizens of the United States
who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." 7
The program at issue in Fullilove was similar to the Davis
program in Bakke in that both involved a set-aside or specific
quota-sixteen places in the Davis Medical School class in Bakke,
and ten percent of the funds in Fullilove. By a vote of six to three,
the Court held that the MBE provision did not violate the equal
protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. As has become increasingly true, especially when
the issue is controversial, there was no opinion for the Court.
Rather, there were two principal opinions in Fullilove, written
on behalf of a majority of the Court with three Justices subscribing to each.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
voted to uphold the program.28 This voting bloc came as no surprise since these Justices had clearly established their position in
Bakke that affirmative action quotas are valid so long as they are
substantially related to an important and articulated government
interest.28 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun had no
trouble finding that the MBE provision met this standard.
The other principal opinion in Fullilove, announcing the
judgment of the Court, was by Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justices White and Powell.3 0 Of great significance were the votes
26 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2) (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
27 Id.

28 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall

& Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the views of these Justices in Bakke.

30 448 U.S. at 453. Justice Whites vote to uphold the MBE provision was anticipated
because of his participation with the Brennan "group of four" in Bakke. 438 U.S. at 324.
The intriguing question to ponder with respect to Justice White in Fullilove relates to intemal decisionmaking, i.e., why did he join the Burger opinion rather than the Marshall

opinion which echoed the Bakke analysis to which Justice White subscribed? Perhaps the

.
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of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell to uphold the MBE
provision since their positions in Fulliloveraise to six the number
of Justices committed to the view that the Constitution does not
prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action. It should be apparent that their views require careful study because each represents the potential fifth vote necessary to sustain future affirmative action programs.-" Before examining their positions, however, let us briefly identify the views of the three dissenting Justices in Fullilove.
A.

The Dissents in Fullilove

The clearest dissenting stance is that of Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist. In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, 32 they
came very close to adopting the view articulated in the elder Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,33 that the equal protection clause demands that government be color-blind.34 Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist argued that all racial discriminations are
invalid, with the limited exception that a court of equity may impose burdens on a racial basis in order to remedy the actual effects of a prior legal violation against a racial or ethnic group in
order to make the identified victims whole.3 This single qualification to an otherwise blanket condemnation of racial discrimination can be illustrated in two contexts: employment and education.
First, suppose a court finds that an employer has discriminated against black employees, thus violating Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. That court, in the view of Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist, could remedy such injustice by increasing the seniority of the victimized black workers and reducing
the seniority of those white workers who presumably had been
best explanation for this somewhat surprising voting arrangement is that Justice White
sought to lend sufficient numerical strength to the Burger opinion so as to allow the Chief
Justice to announce the judgment of the Court.
31 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell each wrote separate opinions with Justice
Powell joining Chief Justice Burger and writing for himself as well.
32 448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34 Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 525 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the beneficiaries of the prior discrimination. Second, with respect to education, suppose a court finds deliberate racial segregation of public schools, a violation of the fourteenth amendment. That court, according to Justices Stewart and Rehnquist,
could order the busing of children in order to eradicate the educational segregation, even though such a course of action would
impose a transportation burden on white children. Apart from
this very narrow exception, however, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist take the view that government affirmative action programs
that allocate benefits or burdens on the basis of race or ethnicity
violate equal protection.
Justice Stevens cannot be categorized as easily as Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist. Although he, too, dissented in Fullilove,36 he is, at least in theory, a potential fifth vote to sustain
other affirmative action programs. Justice Stevens objected to the
'MBE provision on two grounds: substantive and procedural.
Substantively, in Justice Stevens' view the MBE set-aside did
not reflect careful tailoring, and his position that Congress had
painted with too broad a brush in enacting "this slapdash statute" 37 was substantiated on several grounds. One argumentpotentially very controversial-was that the MBE provision included minority groups who have not been as disadvantaged,
and certainly not disadvantaged in the same way, as black Americans.A Justice Stevens reasoned that blacks have suffered a peculiar kind of discrimination, relying on Justice Marshall's separate
opinion in Bakke which recited this country's long and tragic history of discrimination against blacks in contrast to prejudicial behavior towards other racial and ethnic minorities. 39 The MBE
provision, however, lumps together Spanish-speaking citizens,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Negroes for the same
special benefit.
Further, Justice Stevens read the MBE provision as including
all black enterprises, whether or not they had been wrongfully
excluded from the market for public contracts. 40 Particularly in
36

Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

37 Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

-8Id. at 537-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39
Id.at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
40 Id. at 540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the construction industry, he argued, there may be many black
businesses that have not been disadvantaged because of the
twenty year period that federal anti-discrimination laws have
successfully combatted the problem of racial prejudice. 41Justice
Stevens also argued that the program helps the least disadvantaged minority group members in that it primarily benefits those
who have accumulated enough capital to be in the construction
business in the first place. 42 This, he concluded, is a "perverse
form of reparation for members of the injured classes." 43 These
points, and others not elaborated here, strongly suggest that Justice Stevens' vote will be extremely difficult to obtain to uphold
future affirmative action programs.
From a procedural viewpoint, Justice Stevens also objected
to Congress' decisionmaking process in enacting the MBE provision. 4 Before upholding a law that distributes benefits or imposes
burdens along racial or ethnic lines, he would require substantial
consideration by the legislative body of both the need for and the
scope of such a program. 45 This was also a factor important to
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, to whose opinions we
now turn in search of the fifth vote necessary to sustain future affirmative action plans.
B.. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Fullilove: Is
Eitherthe Needed Fifth Vote?
Contrary to media reports and law review commentaries on
Fullilove,46 1 find that the opinions of Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell upholding the MBE provision were extraordinarily qualified. Chief Justice Burger, echoing Justice Powell in
Bakke, wrote that any racial classification requires "a most
searching examination"47 by the Court and that the MBE program itself might "press the outer limits of congressional authorId. at 539 -40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 538-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44Id. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45 d. at 549-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HAMv. L. REv. 75, 125-38 (1980).
41 Fulllove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 491. See also id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring)
("Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent level of review ....).
41
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ity."48 Indeed, as shall be suggested below, the Chief Justice may
have even stretched the record at some points to justify his rationale for sustaining the statute in Fullilove.
Why did the Chief Justice and Justice Powell write so narrowly? On the one hand, they may simply have wished to go no
further than necessary to uphold this program, not wanting to
commit themselves beyond it. On the other hand, one could fairly speculate that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell were
laying a foundation for striking down other affirmative action
schemes.19 In any event, the narrowness of their opinions is
evinced by a number of factors.
1.

Special Powers of Congress

In Fullilove, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
stressed that the MBE provision-at least as applied to the action
of state and local governments-was enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to enforce equal protection under section five
of the fourteenth amendment, 5 perhaps implicitly suggesting
that the identical program might not pass muster if enacted by a
state legislature or by a federal or state administrative agency. 51
The Chief Justice said that no organ of government has greater
power than Congress to remedy the present effects of past racial
or ethnic discrimination,5 a theme echoed by Justice Powell,
who observed that Congress had a "unique constitutional
power" -, in this regard, strongly implying that the Civil War
amendments gave Congress singular authority to employ raceconscious remedies.- 4 Such a posture draws one to a basic ques48 Id. at 490.

'9 Indeed, on the same day that the Court decided Fullilove, it granted certiorari in
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 448 U.S. 910 (1981), a case challenging an affirmative action plan for women and minority employees in the California prison system.
Though the case was eventually dismissed on procedural grounds, Minnick v. California
Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 127 (1981), there are several grounds, as shall be observed, by which that plan can be distinguished from the program upheld in Fullilove.
50 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 478; id. at 508-10 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
51It is interesting to note in this regard that the California prison employment plan
in Minnick was adopted by the State Department of Corrections. 452 U.S. at 107-08.
52 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 483.
53 Id. at 500. The "special competence" of Congress in this regard was alluded to by
Justice Powell in his Bakke opinion. 438 U.S. at 302 n.41.

54 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 508-10, 516 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tion: is there a constitutional principle by which Congress can be
permitted to enact a program which would violate equal protection if adopted by a state legislature or by a federal or state administrative agency? There is one decision articulating a doctrine
that would permit the Court to hold that it is one thing for Congress to enact a preference for minorities (such as the MBE provision), but that it is altogether another thing for a federal administrative agency to do so, even pursuant to a broad delegation from
Congress.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong- involved a Federal Civil Service Commission rule generally denying resident aliens civil service employment. Despite the fact that "under the traditional
standards governing the delegation of authority the Civil Service
Commission was fully empowered"' . 6 to make such a rule, the
Court fashioned a novel doctrine that has lain dormant since
then. The Court assumed that Congress or the President might
themselves expressly mandate discrimination against aliens in
this way, but it held that as a matter of due process Congress and
the President could not broadly authorize a federal administrative agency to affect the "important libeity" 57at stake unless that
agency had special competence or "direct responsibility" over
the matter.
The Mow Sun Wong doctrine could easily be extended to situations involving state administrative agencies; indeed, Justice
Powell seemed to take this conceptual path in Bakke when he
urged that the University of California Board of Regents was not
a properly authorized body to adopt a race-conscious affirmative
action plan. 59 Interestingly, Justice Powell cited Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong for that proposition,60 reflecting his perception
of the special type of governmental body that may take this very
sensitive kind of action.
The next step in this conceptual process is determining whether the legislative-administrative agency dichotomy can also be
5 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
dissenting).
56 d. at 123 (Rehnquist, J.,
57Id. at 116.
8Id. at 103.
59 See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Powell's
view in Bakke regarding the properly authorized body to adopt a race-conscious program.
60 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309.
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extended to apply to a distinction between Congress and a state
legislature. Surely, one would surmise, the California legislature,
in contrast to the Regents of the University, is a properly authorized body to remedy past societal discrimination. Nonetheless,
there is a constitutional principle potentially available to the
Court that might be employed in a ruling that Congress has
greater power than a state legislature to adopt an affirmative action program benefiting racial and ethnic minorities.
This doctrine has its genesis in the case of Katzenbach v.
Morgan,61 where the Warren Court held that Congress has broad
power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to define
what constitutes a violation of equal protection. 62 Pursuant to
that power, Congress can outlaw practices as being violative of
equal protection even though the Court itself would not find an
equal protection violation.63 The dissenters in Morgan argued
that the majority had created a two-way street-that once Congress is given power to define what constitutes a violation of
equal protection, Congress cannot be limited to expanding equal
protection but may also contract the equal protection decisions of
the Supreme Court. 4 But, in a famous footnote, the majority denied that its rationale gave Congress the power to dilute-as well
as to expand-the Court's equal protection judgments. 6
The Morgan decision is now sixteen years old and the Court's
composition has changed markedly over that time. Subsequent
opinions by various Justices have construed the reach of Morgan's
holding, concerning the power of Congress to define the substance of the fourteenth amendment differently than the Court,
in various ways. 6 In all, one can fairly surmise that the ruling's
present status is uncertain.
Despite this uncertainty, suppose that the Kentucky legislature enacted a minority set-aside just as Congress did in Fullilove. A majority of the Court might reason that, under section

61384 U.S. 641 (1966).
82 Id. at 648-49.
6' Id. at 649.

64 Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6' Id. at 651-52 n. 10.
6 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400

U.S. 112 (1970).
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five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress, but only Congress,
has power to reconcile the competing demands of equal protection by using racial and ethnic criteria to remedy past societal
discrimination against disadvantaged minorities. Correlative to
that pronouncement, the Court might assert that if a state legislature imposes burdens on a racial or ethnic basis, even on members of the majority in order to help disadvantaged minorities,
such legislation violates the equal protection clause of section one
of the fourteenth amendment. This distinction would be
grounded on the premise that the Supreme Court is in a special
posture when it interprets the scope of Congress' power to define
equal protection under section five of the fourteenth amendment, and that it must give special deference to Congress' conclusion that its race-conscious program does not violate equal
protection. Yet the Court need give no such deference to a state
legislature, the question whether a racial or ethnic classification
enacted by a state legislature violates equal protection being the
Court's alone. One can only speculate as to whether this argument would persuade a majority of the present Court.
In addition to perceived special congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell seemed to find a special discretion in Congress with respect to legislative factfinding capacity as well. The Chief Justice
placed great emphasis on the fact that Congress had "abundant
evidence" before it that minority firms had been disadvantaged
by past discrimination which resulted in present discriminatory
effects.67 Justice Powell concluded that there was "a reasonable
congressional finding" of such discrimination.68 Such an evidentiary focus could be a significant ground for distinguishing subsequent cases if the legislative body that enacts the affirmative action program does not have "abundant evidence" or makes no
"findings."
The perplexing aspect of this argument is that a review of the
evidence Congress actually had before it leads to the conclusion
that "abundant" is a most generous adjective. The fact is that the
MBE provision was introduced in both the House and Senate as a

67 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 477-78.
68 Id. at 503 n.4 (PoweU, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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floor amendment, never previously considered by any congressional committee. 69 There was some floor discussion that "cited
the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year 1976 less than
1% of all federal procurement was concluded with minority business enterprises," 70 but the MBE provision dealt with funds to be
used for state and local government public works projects. Thus,
the principal evidence directly presented to Congress at the time
was only indirectly related to the problem at hand.7
In support of his conclusion that Congress had "abundant
evidence" regarding state and local contracting, Chief Justice
Burger relied mainly on a House Committee on Small Business
report that had been presented in connection with other proposed legislation eight weeks before the MBE provision was introduced on the floor of the House.7 2 This 1977 report of the
Small Business Committee, Chief Justice Burger emphasized,
summarized a 1975 report of another House subcommittee that
dealt with the low participation of minority businesses infederal
construction.7 3 The Chief Justice observed that the 1975 subcommittee report had, in turn, taken "full notice" of reports submitted to Congress by the General Accounting Office and the
Civil Rights Commission, the latter of which detailed the barriers that existed for minority businesses respecting federal, state
and local government contracts.7 4 Justice Powell referred essentially to the same evidence.7 5
In fairness to Chief Justice Burger, he did not simply say "this
is abundant evidence." Rather, after stating the facts recited
above, he concluded that Congress-unlike a court or an administrative agency-is not required to make a formal and complete
"record" and can take informal cognizance of other information
presented to its constituent parts.7 6 That is, Congress as a whole is
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
71 See also id. at 478 ("[Mluch of this history related to the experience of minority
business in the area of federal procurement. ...).
72 This report, however, "was not mentioned by anyone during the very brief discussion" of the MBE amendment. Id. at 550 n. 25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
73 Id. at 465.
74 Id. at 466.
75
Id.at 504-05 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
76 Id. at 478.
9
70
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charged with knowledge of prior committee reports, that incorporate subcommittee reports, referring to reports of the Civil
Rights Commission.77 Justice Powell, in his separate opinion,
echoed this rationale, which assumes that Congress has full
knowledge of all that its committee reports contain even when
not directly related to the subject at issue. 78
This suggests, then, another possible ground for distinguishing Fullilove from a future case-one that involves an affirmative action plan adopted by a body other than Congress-namely, that Congress has greater leeway in regard to the kind of record that must be compiled. The Court could decide to give
greater deference to Congress' perception of "abundant evidence" than to that of a state legislature enacting a similar raceconscious plan. 79
2.

Type of Relief Sought

Chief Justice Burger also emphasized that the MBE provision
was being challenged on its face. He explained that the plaintiffs
were associations of construction contractors and subcontractors,
not seeking money damages for any specific injury suffered, but
asking only for prospective relief-a declaratory judgment that
the MBE provision was invalid and an injunction against any
further set-aside of funds.80 In a footnote, however, Chief Justice
Burger acknowledged that the complaint did allege three instances in which nonminority firms would have been awarded
contracts were it not for the MBE provision. 8 ' But, he said, this
injury was asserted only to establish that the plaintiffs had standing, not to seek redress for the injury.8" Thus, since the statute
was being challenged only on its face, the Chief Justice reasoned
that doubts as to its future applications must be resolved in Congress' favor. 8
77 See id.

Id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring).
See id. at 515-16 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The degree of specificity required
in the findings of discrimination ... may vary with the nature and authority of a governmental body.").
80 Id. at 480.
81 Id. at 480-81 n.71.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 481.
78
'9
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Whether Chief Justice Burger can persuasively distinguish an
allegation of injury used to establish standing from an allegation
of injury used to show that the MBE provision as applied has resulted in specific constitutional violations may well appear problematic. But the distinction's significance becomes clearer upon
consideration of how the Chief Justice interpreted other features
regarding the scope of the MBE provision so as to imply that virtually no constitutionally cognizable injury was being suffered by
any nonminority firm.
3.

Limited Durationand Extent of the Program

Another facet of Fullilove which served to further qualify the
Burger and Powell opinions was the limited duration of the program. The Chief Justice characterized it as "a pilot project,"84
with the consequence that any miscarriage of justice will have
only a "transitory economic impact." ' This sentiment was mirrored by Justice Powell when he observed that the MBE provision "is not a permanent part of federal contracting requirements."86 This temporal factor provides a basis for distinguishing
a longer term affirmative action program, even one promulgated
by Congress. Indeed, it is not irrelevant to observe that in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 87 which held that a privately
bargained affirmative action plan for employment did not violate the racial discrimination bar of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Court's opinion-written by Justice Brennan
and joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun (as well
as by Justice Stewart)-highlighted the fact that the program
was only "a temporary measure. '' 8
Not only is the program in Fullilove not of unlimited duration but, as Chief Justice Burger noted, the program is "limited
in extent" as well since only ten percent of all construction project grants were involved."9 Discussing this factor more fully, Jus84
Id. at 489.
8
5

86

Id.

Id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring).

87 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
88 Id. at 208. For a discussion of the implications of Weber for the constitutionality
of affirmative action plans generally, seeJ. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1978-1979 at 47-50 (1979).
89 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 489.
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tice Powell found the ten percent allocation reasonable because it
falls roughly halfway between the percentage of minorities in the
population as a whole (about seventeen percent) and the percentage of minority contractors (four percent). 9° The logic of that
averaging process may be questionable, but it underscores the
significance of the point for Justice Powell. 91
4. Absence of a Burdensome Effect
Both the Burger and Powell opinions in Fullilove also pointed
out that the burdens imposed on innocent parties (that is, nonminority firms who' had not engaged in racial discrimination) are
"relatively light" 92 and "not sufficiently significant." 93 Both Justices cited statistics showing that the amount of funds under the
MBE provision flowing to minority businesses, which comprised
four percent of the nation's contractors, had amounted to only
one-fourth of one percent of all construction funds spent annually in the United States.9 4 The role which this evidence played especially in Justice Powell's reasoning is evident from his characterization of the effect on "innocent third parties" as a "crucial
factor."95

This concern with burdensome effects on innocent parties
could well be an important future issue since it had surfaced regularly throughout the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence
even prior to Fullilove. As early as the United Jewish Organizations case, no less than five of the seven members of the Court
voting to sustain New York's race-conscious redistricting
scheme-Justices Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens-had emphasized that the plan neither "minimize[d]
'oId. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
91 In this vein, one can contrast the program in Fullilove with the California prison
plan in Minnick. In Minnick, the employment goal for racial and ethnic minorities was
over 35%, obviously a very different percentage than that at work in Fullilove. 452 U.S.
at 109. Furthermore, the concern with the extent of affirmative action programs was even
manifest in the dissenting opinion in Bakke where the Brennan "group of four" observed
that the 16% set-aside of the Davis program represented "a percentage less than that of the
minority population in California." 438 U.S. at 374 n.58 (Brennan, White, Marshall &
Blackmuri, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 484.
" Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 484 n.72; id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).
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[n]or unfairly cancel[led] out white voting strength,"9 nor "un-

dervalued the political power of white voters relative to their
numbers." 97 The remaining two Justices-Brennan and Blackmun-concurred with Justice White's observation that the complainants had neither alleged nor proved that the new plan accomplished anything "more than the restoration of nonwhite voting strength" to prior levels. 98 In Bakke, Justice Powell distinguished United Jewish Organizationsand other decisions upholding race-conscious remedies by stressing that the Davis Medical
School plan "totally foreclosed" nonminority applicants.9 9 And in
Weber, the Court had emphasized the fact that the collective
bargaining plan did "not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
the white employees" because it did "not require the discharge of
white workers."'1°
There is an unanswered question here, of course: what constitutes a sufficiently heavy burden? In a case such as Bakke,, in
which it can be shown that the race-conscious quota has totally
excluded the plaintiff from a substantial benefit, it may be much
harder for the Court to conclude that the burden is insubstantial.
Yet, Chief Justice Burger, after discussing the modest burden imposed in Fullilove, added that Congress may have determined
that some nonminority firms who would lose out as a result of the
MBE program may have themselves reaped competitive benefit
from past discrimination against minorities in contracting.10 ' The
Chief Justice's recognition that such an "equalizing effect"
among minority and nonminority firms may result from raceconscious programs leaves open the possibility that a plan which
completely excludes certain groups will not be held unconstitutional. 02 Nonetheless, challengers of future affirmative action
96 United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 165.
97 Id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J.,
concurring, joined byPowell, J.).
98
Id.at 163.
99 438 U.S. at 305.
100 443 U.S. at 208.
101 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 484-85.

This recognition of a possible equalizing effect was essentially made by the dissenting Justices in Bakke:
If it was reasonable to conclude-as we hold that it was-that the failure of
minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was
due principally to the effects of past discrimination, then there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent
102
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plans will not likely forget that Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell emphasized that the burdens'imposed on nonminorities
by the MBE preference were relatively light. Nor will they likely
forget that in Bakke, where the burden was greater, only four
03
Justices voted to sustain the program. 1

5.

Flexibility of the Ten PercentAllocation

Finally, another factor outlined by Chief Justice Burger in
Fullilove may well constitute the strongest evidence of the narrowness of the Burger and Powell views. The Chief Justice
stressed that the ten percent figure was not inflexible. 104 While
the statute in Fullilove provided that at least ten percent of the
funds be expended for minority firms, it also contained the clause
"except to the extent that the Secretary [of Commerce] determines otherwise."' 15 Thus, the ten percent quota was not absolute, and regulations and guidelines promulgated pursuant to the
statute provided for waivers of and exemptions from the requirement.
Before examining these regulations and guidelines, it is interesting to note how they were characterized by Chief Justice Burger. He stressed Congress' intention that any minority contractor

shown not to be suffering from the effects of past discrimination
should be excluded from the program, and that the regulations
and guidelines would prevent misapplications of Congress'

would have failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of Davis' special admissions program.
438 U.S. at 365-66 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
103 In conjunction with the discussion of the absence of a burdensome effect on innocent parties, it should be noted that the Chief Justice also specified that no indication was
present that Congress had excluded any equally disadvantaged minority group from participation in the Fullilove program. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 486. This may well
be an issue pressed by challengers of future programs. For example, a group of indigent
whites or, more persuasively, recent Caribbean, Latin American or Southeast Asian immigrants, may seek inclusion in an affirmative action program. Though not included in
most such plans, these groups could argue that while they may not have been disadvantaged in the same way as black Americans, their disadvantage is nonetheless sufficient to
place them within any race-conscious program.
104 Id. at 488. Recall that a major issue in Bakke was that sixteen places in each
Davis Medical School class had specifically been set aside. 438 U.S. at 305.
105 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
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goals.' ° 6 Moreover, portions of the Chief Justice's opinion might
even be read as suggesting that those entitled to participate in the
set-aside need not be members of the six designated racial and
ethnic groups.107
The Burger opinion pointed to earlier regulations and guidelines under the Small Business Act of 1953, promulgated by the
Small Business Administration, which also had a minority group
clause that named the same six minorities as the MBE provision-"black Americans, American Indians, Spanish-Americans,
oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts."' l The Small Business
Administration regulations and guidelines made two things very
clear. First, if it could be shown that a business within one of the
named minority groups was not socially or economically disadvantaged, it was not to be entitled to participate. 10 Second, if an
applicant could show deprivation "of the opportunity to develop
and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of
social or economic disadvantage,""n0 the applicant was also eligible to participate in the Small Business Act affirmative action
program even though it was not from one of the named minority
groups. II
Thus, Chief Justice Burger underscored the fact that "[t]he
sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the Senate expressly linked" 2 it to the Small Business Act and placed "their reliance on prior administrative practice"" 3 reflected in the regulations and guidelines of the Small Business Administration. The
Chief Justice relied strongly upon this reference to prior legislation to substantiate the flexibility of the MBE provision-both in
terms of excluding undeserving members of the designated mi-

106Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 464.
1o7Id. at 486.
108 Id.at 464 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c)(1) (1977)).
1o'See

13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c)(1) (1977).
110 Id.
II Id.
112 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 463.
113Id. at 471.
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nority groups" 4 and perhaps even in terms of including disadvantaged nonminority firms. 115
One could argue strongly that the MBE regulations and
guidelines do not admit of the interpretation Chief Justice Burger
gave them. For example, one guideline provides that a minority
firm may be excluded from the preference if it asks an unreasonable price., 6 The Chief Justice interprets "unreasonable price" as
one that is noncompetitive and that cannot be attributed to the
present effects of past discrimination. 11 It would seem that such
"unreasonableness" is well-nigh impossible to prove, and that the
unreasonable price guideline will exclude virtually no minority
firms. Surely, a minority business could persuasively contend
that its costs are higher because of past discrimination-that, because of this historical prejudice, it lacks the savvy to master the
intricacies of the government contracting process and that for
like reasons it has been more difficult for the minority business to
establish favorable credit ratings in the past. These arguments
and others could serve to trace almost any noncompetitive price
to past discrimination.
Another regulation provides that if the prime contractor can
show that its best efforts in obtaining minority subcontractors are
unavailing, the ten percent requirement may be waived.", But
this has nothing to do with excluding minority firms that have
not suffered from past discrimination (nor with including any
other firms that show they are suffering from past discrimination
but that do not come within the designated categories).
114 Id. at 469-72. For evidence of the sensitivity of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun to this point as well, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 377-78.
115 Chief Justice Burger observed that inclusion of the specified minority groups
"demonstrates that Congress concluded they were victims of discrimination. Petitioners
did not press any challenge to Congress' classification categories in the Court of Appeals;
there is no reason for this Court to pass upon the issue at this time." Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. at 487-88.
116
U.S. DEPr OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, EDA
MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TECHNICAL BULLETIN (ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE & INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO GRANTEES & THEIR CONTRACTORS IN MEETING THE 10% MBE RE-

QUIREMENT) 9-10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EDA Technical Bulletin].
117Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 471.

118 U.S. DEFT OF C8MMERCE, LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM, ROUND II, GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION LPW GRANTs (1977).
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Finally, Chief Justice Burger adverted to a regulation concerning "unjust participation" by minority firms." 9 He appeared
to interpret this as being applicable if a nonminority contractor
complains that a minority enterprise about to be given a contract
at a noncompetitive price has not suffered from past discrimination. 120 But the parameters of "unjust participation" are nowhere
delineated in the regulations, which only establish a procedural
structure through which contractors may challenge procurements.' 2 The regulation referred to by the Chief Justice would
appear to pertain to participation by a firm that is not really a
minority enterprise-for example, one that claims that more
than fifty percent of its shareholders are minority group persons
when in fact such shareholdings are merely a sham.
Therefore, Chief Justice Burger upheld the MBE provision
on a "flexibility" limitation that was not clearly present while
perhaps laying a foundation to shift his vote in a future case involving a truly inflexible set-aside. 12
CONCLUSION

We are left confronting the basic inquiry with which our discussion began: what is the constitutional future of affirmative action? While our analysis certainly indicates that no one can predict with confidence the exact nature of this future, it would
seem fair to postulate that the road ahead for many raceconscious programs will not be an easy one.
The Supreme Court's performance in this area has been anything but a paragon of clarity and predictability. When the issue
first manifested itself, a sharply divided Court in DeFunis v.
Odegaard'2 abstained from addressing the question at all. As we
observed, the three subsequent affirmative action decisions that

119 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 487-88.

"0Id. at 488.
121 EDA Technical Bulletin, supra note 116, at 19.
12 Again one can differentiate the California prison plan in dispute in Minnick from
the Fullilove plan. That plan did not involve a fixed quota, but rather afforded only a
"plus" for women and minorities until a predetermined goal was achieved. Minnick v.
California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. at 108-10.
123 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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reached the merits failed to produce an opinion for the Court. 124
The most recent case before the Court involving a race-conscious
program-which the Court chose to review after it had been upheld by the state courts'2--was dismissed on procedural grounds
"because of significant ambiguities in the record." 121 This history
reflects the continued uncertainty of at least several of the Justices as to the proper resolution of this sensitive issue and demonstrates that we have by no means heard the last word from the
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action programs.

12 United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448.
12 Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1979).
126 Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. at 127.

